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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the only attempt, prior to the 1970s era of DURD, 
to establish a significant role on the part of the Commonwealth government in 
urban and regional planning in Australia. Previous commentators on the period 
concerned - the 1940s - have contrasted the Commonwealth Housing 
Commission of 1943-44, in a context on post-war reconstruction fervour, with 
the demise of any Commonwealth role from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. 
These commentators have attributed this outcome to the general swing to the 
right in the late 1940s. The paper looks at three areas ofCHC recommendations 
- community facilities, town planning and regional planning- and attributes the 
demise of Commission recommendations to an even more entrenched set of 
bureaucratic and political factors taking effect as early as 194445. 
The paper documents the consistent gap between the CHC radical proposals and 
the more circumscribed follow-up efforts of the CHC's auspice body, the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction. Most of these differences are seen to 
relate to the scale and pre-conditions of Commonwealth financial assistance to 
State and Local government, with the Commission pre-figuring a more 
financially generous but centralist role for the Commonwealth. The also 
documents the stark gulf between the Department's advocacy and its 
achievements. In the case of community facilities and town planning the 
DPWR's advocacy efforts, which began in earnest in early-1944, had virtually 
petered out by late 1945. In the case of regional planning, debate within the 
government went on longer and did result in some significant commonwealth 
initiatives in the late 1940s (though even these were more in the nature of major 
public works than regional planning enterprises). The paper suggests that 
outcomes in this area were more tangible than in the first two because regional 
planning was perceived to have strategic-military value. 
The paper presents four major reasons for the failure of the Commonwealth 
Housing Commission's agenda to take hold. The first, and least important, was a 
certain weakness in DPWR's operations in the policy-making process, this 
weakness stemming from bureaucratic inexperience on the part of some of 
DPWR's recruits from ouitside the Public Service. The second factor was the 
consistent signal from Chifley, as Treasurer and (up to March 1945) Minister 
for Post-War Reconstruction, that 'newer' ventures in planning had to take a 
lower priority than housing - both in terms of financial and physical resources 
and even bureaucratic energies. The third, somewhat related factor was the 
unrelenting opposition of Treasury officials to the entry of the Commonwealth 
v 
into new fields of activity. A key aspect of the paper is its highlighting of the 
often misleading arguments and devious tactics of Treasury in its tussle with 
DPWR. Finally, the paper points to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of State 
governments generally for a Commonwealth entry into fields associated with 
State and Local Government and the strong antagonism of some non-Labor 
administrations in particular. 
The paper thus presents a microcosm of many of the same issues and conflicts 




Australia's Postwar-Reconstruction era, broadly covering the years between 
1943 and 1949, has been much invoked and cited in the literature of federal 
political history and public policy, yet it has attracted little in the way of 
rigorous analysis and detailed study. There have been valuable accounts of 
aspects of Postwar Reconstruction from participants such as H.C. Coombs, 
Lloyd Ross, L.F. Crisp and Ronald Mendelsohn, and some useful journal 
articles, but the fundamental administrative history of the period remains to be 
written. It is generally conceded that the Postwar Reconstruction years were 
seminal, and influential, but the enduring achievement from a ferment of policy 
documentation has been relatively meagre. Generally, the attempts to explain 
why policy implementation largely failed have ben superficial and 
unconvincing. 
An important attempt to document and analyse Postwar Reconstruction was 
made at a conference organised by the Research School of Social Sciences at the 
Australian National University in September 198l.This brought together policy 
formulators and administrators, who were involved in the work of Postwar 
Reconstruction, with writers, academics and students active in its interpretation. 
The transcript of the conference, held by the Australian National Library, 
remains an excellent source for studies in the period, and several journal articles 
have been published on policy and administrative aspects of Postwar 
Reconstruction based on the conference proceedings. 
Michael Howard contributed to this conference and he has continued the analysis 
of Postwar Reconstruction planning and housing policies, based on meticulous 
research into the vast amount of archival material that is now 
available.Howard's work challenges a number of the conventional 
interpretations of Postwar Reconstruction. For example, he suggests 
convincingly that federal initiatives in the crucial area of community, town and 
regional planning were stifled just as much by resistance within the federal 
bureaucracy and lack of political will on the part of Labor ministers as by such 
traditional scapegoats as the States and the non-Labor political parties. He also 
argues plausibly that important parts of the Postwar Reconstruction program 
vii 
had been virtually discarded by 1945-46, somewhat earlier than other analysts 
have suggested. The Urban Research Unit is happy to publish what it considers 
an important re-interpretation of important elements in Australia's federal 
administrative history and hopes that it will stimulate further productive 
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Since Federation in 1901 there have been only two periods in which a political 
attempt has been made to establish a strong Commonwealth role in urban and 
regional planning in Australia. The first was the period of post-war 
reconstruction in the 1940s; the second, the period of the Whitlam government 
in the 1970s. Political analysis has focused very largely on the more recent of 
these two episodes. Various dimensions of political conflict in the 1970s over a 
Commonwealth role have been documented: conflict between the political 
parties, between the Federal and State governments and between Departments 
within the Federal government.2 That the Whitlam-Fraser period has received 
more attention is appropriate, since the scale of Commonwealth initiatives 
undertaken and the level of conflict aroused was greater than in the 1940s. Yet 
developments in the 1940s were not inconspicuous and the outcome of the 
conflicts of this time were of great long-term significance, establishing a 
political and policy paradigm that was not challenged until Whittam's 
government and, then, as it turned out, unsuccessfully. 
This work-in-progress paper presents a political analysis of developments 
within three areas of post-war reconstruction that directly manifested a concept 
of urban planning: 'community facilities', 'town planning' and 'regional 
planning'. The paper focuses on policy-making within the Federal government 
and negotiations between the Federal and State ·governments in these three 
related areas. A broadly similar pattern of political development is observed 
across all three areas: on the one hand, adyocacy during 1943-5 of a greatly 
enlarged peace-time Commonwealth role, this advocacy within the Federal 
government centred on the Department of Post-War Reconstruction and this 
Department's off-shoot Reconstruction Commissions; and, on the other, 
resistance to this idea during 1943-5 and later, both from other quarters of the 
Federal government, mainly the Treasury, and from State governments. This 
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policy-making conflict was most intense and seminal during 1944-5, with the 
forces of resistance winning decisively. 
The early post-war activity of the Commonwealth in the three areas examined 
did amount to something more than the negligible pre-war activity of the 
Commonwealth but it fell far short of the role conjured up by the 'planners' 
during 1943-4. Consequently, the weak role played by the Commonwealth 
government in areas loosely associated with the concepts of 'physical planning' 
and 'urban planning' in the two decades leading up to the establishment of 
DURD by the Whitlam government was not a development that can be attributed 
to the onset of the Coaiition government in 1949, as Whitlam (1970) once 
implied.3 The pattern of a very weak role took shape during 1944-5 and was 
firmly entrenched by 1949. This paper will pay special attention to the obstacles 
to an expanded role, as these were perceived and argued within the Federal 
government in the mid 1940s. 
In this respect the paper advances beyond the analysis contained in the three 
main (though short) commentaries on this topic to date - those of Sandercock 
(1977 and 1983) and Lloyd and Troy (1978). All three commentaries agree on 
the historic importance of the advocacy of a greater Commonwealth role that 
occurred in the period. To Sandercock, 
The Curtin and Chifley Labor governments of 1942-9 were the first 
federal governments to take an interest in the fate of Australian cities 
while Lloyd and Troy venture the opinion that 
The [Commonwealth Housing Commission's] final report of25 August 
1944 is a remarkable document, perhaps the most comprehensive and 
imaginative ever presented to a government in Australia. 
Implementation in full of {this] report would have given the 
Commonwealth an unparalleled opportunity to embark on a full-scale 
policy for urban and regional development. Ground which was won 
only with difficulty in the unfavourable climate of the seventies could 
have been taken in 1945 with much less effort. 
All three commentaries also agree that, with the important exception of housing, 
very little of these 'wide horizons', these 'great plans and preparations', were 
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acted upon and brought to fruition, either before 1949 or in the two decades 
after.4 
All three commentaries seek to explain the Chifley government's poor record of 
implementation in terms of the ~political situation in Australia in the late 
1940's. Sandercock's argument can be paraphrased as follows. Ministers and 
public servants sympathetic to ideas of physical planning understood that the 
provision of community facilities and the exercise of 'town' and 'regional' 
planning ultimately entailed some degree of regulation of property rights and 
the private land market. In a context where economic regulation in general was 
failing to make headway against the propaganda of vested Big Capital interests 
and the restiveness and private material aspirations of the electorate, these 
circles simply lacked the confidence and energy to sustain these ideas. Lloyd and 
Troy also imply that physical planning was simply another casualty of the 
extraneous general push for 'private enterprise' (what Connell has referred to as 
a 'counter-mobilisation') but they also point to two other, obviously related 
contextual factors - the division of constitutional powers in the Federal system 
and the sheer weight of the Labor government's overall efforts in post-war 
reconstruction. 5 
This paper is an advance upon these three brief commentaries in two ways. 
First, whereas the commentaries are limited to a summary of the 
recommendations and outlook of the Commonwealth Housing Commission 
(CHC), this paper also refers to the follow-up proposals and Cabinet submissions 
of the Department of Post-War Reconstruction (DPWR). Second, whereas the 
three commentaries fail to show how the general factors or forces of resistance 
were manifest in the specific fields under discussion, this paper does just this. In 
particular, the paper highlights the following constraining factors in policy-
making in the three fields of community facilities, town planning and regional 
planning: 
weaknesses in the advocacy effort of the DPWR; 
the pervasive negative influence of Treasury officials; 
the special burden of the 'housing-first' policy; 
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the suspicion and defensiveness of State governments; 
and, as testimony to the impact of these factors during 1944-9; 
the relative unimportance in the three fields examined of the change 
of Party in office in 1949. 
Community Facilities 
Policy making in regard to a Commonwealth role in 'community facilities' 
largely took the form of an encounter between two small groups of officials 
within the federal government. The first group was located within the 
Community Facilities and Regional Planning Sections of DPWR and also in the 
DPWR's off-shoot apparatus, the CHC (the Commission reported to the 
Director-General of DPWR, not the Minister); the second group was located 
within the Social Services Branch of Treasury. The issue at stake was whether 
the Commonwealth government should undertake a funding role in this area. 
The first group and its superior, the Director General H.C. Coombs, was 
strongly in favour; the second group, led by Assistant Secretary H.J. Goodes, 
largely opposed. The tussle between the individuals on each side can be seen in 
terms of four phases, with the efforts of the DPWR officials petering out in the 
third phase, leaving the Treasury 'line' unchallenged in the fourth post-1946 
phase. 
The first phase began with the establishment of the CHC in April 1943 and ended 
with two events coinciding in August 1944, the submission to the Minister for 
Post-War Reconstruction of the CHC's Final Report and the penultimate 
drafting of a Commonwealth -State Housing Agreement (CSHA). The first 
moves on the DPWR/CHC side came with the submission of the CHC's First and 
Second Interim Reports in October 1943 and March 1944. In these reports the 
Commission set down two principles: the Commonwealth should not provide 
fmancial assistance to the State governments for public housing unless the States 
ensured that community facilities were provided on public housing estates; and 
the Commonwealth should contribute towards the cost of these facilities.6 The 
Cabinet submission on a post-war public housing scheme put forward 
(successfully) by DPWR in November 1943, in the wake of the First Interim 
~. did not include any commitment to community facilities but the 
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submission foreshadowed a later, separate submission on this subject.? Six 
months later the Commonwealth submission to a Commonwealth-State Housing 
Officers Conference (on the CSHA) indicated that the 'detailed 
recommendations' of, the CHC on community facilities were now being 
examined by the government and would form the basis of later discussions with 
the States. 8 
In these recommendations, set out in a separate chapter of the Final RCl?ort, the 
Commission distinguished between 'minimum' and 'later-stage' facilities. The l 
former the Commission specifically identified as: shops; schools; 'playing 1 
areas'; 'infant health and pre-school child welfare centres'; and a 'meeting hall'. -' 
Because it believed that 'without these particular facilities any housing 
development may be a social failure' the Commission insisted that these facilities 
be built concurrently with houses, even in those estates to be commenced during 
the war and the immediate post-war period when the shortage of building 
resources relative to housing demand was likely to be acute. In this scenario the 
Commonwealth would have prime responsibility and power. It would bear one-
third of the cost of land and construction (more in 'special circumstances') but it 
would make this assistance, and indeed all public housing assistance, conditional 
upon State and Local authorities erecting these 'minimum' facilities to the 
physical standards laid down by the Commonwealth itself (by a 'Commonwealth 
Community Facilities Committee').9 
Under the Commission's blueprint land would also have to be set aside from the 
outset for a wide range of later-stage facilities. Under headings such as 'health', 
'recreational' and 'educational and cultural' the Commission specified an \ 
impressive list of desirable amenities, some (such as an 'adult health centre') 
quite novel. Construction of these amenities could be dovetailed with the easing 
of the housing crisis and the evolution of ideas and management skills by 
resident communities Again, the cost of land and construction should be borne 
equally by the three levels of government. Finally, as the bridge between the 
minimum and the advanced facilities, the Commission called on the 
Commonwealth to fmance unilaterally the construction of one experimental 
multi-purpose community centre in each State.10 
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Even as it took shape, however, the Commission's strategy was being 
undermined by developments in housing policy. As early as August 1943 
Treasury officers had raised objections to Commonwealth funding of 
community facilities (the grounds of objection have not yet been ascertained).11 
Then, at the Premiers' Conference in January 1944 Chifley, in his capacity as 
Treasurer (rather than as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction), struck a 
warning note. Reports of post-war government programmes with large 
expenditures for 'town halls and other public buildings' were, Chifley said, 
misleading: 
The view of the Commonwealth government is that houses for the 
people must come first; and because of the shortage of building 
materials, it is likely that those public building projects will have to 
stand over.12 . 
But the coup de grace to the CHC idea of community facilities as a condition of 
public housing funding was delivered by the Federal government at the 
Premiers' Conference in August 1944. The CSHA 'clause' submitted by the 
Government (after consultation with Treasury) and accepted by the Premiers 
committed neither side. It merely empowered the Commonwealth Treasurer, if 
so inclined, to make an 'arrangement' for a financial 'contribution' by the 
Commonwealth to any State which chose to provide community facilities on a 
CSHA estate. Discussion of clause 15(3) at the Conference only pointed up the 
precarious attachment of the government to a Commonwealth role. At one 
point, in response to questions, Curtin remarked curtly to all the Premiers: 'If 
you do not like that provision you may leave it out of your legislation·. 13 
The second phase of policy-making extended from August 1944 to a 
Commonwealth-State Housing Officers Conference in June 1945 and saw 
DPWR officials seek but fail to obtain belated Federal government endorsement 
of the 'minimum facilities' component of the CHC plan. Indeed, in a context of 
highly disappointing progress in building output, even DPWR officials 
themselves were forced to relinquish part of the CHC's set of 'minimum' 
recommendations. On two occasions, in July-August 1944 and in January 1945, 
Cabinet submissions were drafted by Lloyd Ross, Director of the Public 
Relations Division and Community Facilities Section of DPWR, in consultation 
with Grenfell Rudduck, senior officer in DPWR's Regional Planning Section. 
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Both sets of draft submissions put forward two recommendations, inspired by 
the CHC: (i) that the Commonwealth signal to the States its desire for them to 
proceed with the allocation of land and the construction of the CHC's 'minimum' 
facilities on CSHA estates, with the costs to be shared in the same way as CSHA 
housing costs; and (ii) that the Commonwealth allocate 40,000 pounds for the 
construction of the CHC's pilot community centres.l 4 On both occasions, 
although they had the firm support of Coombs, both submissions were 
withdrawn before they reached PWR Minister Chifley - the reason being the 
adverse reaction of Treasury. 
In both instances the main objection raised by Assistant Secretary Goodes was 
the absence of a pre-existing policy for Commonwealth funding in this area. 
According to Goodes, the financing of the services envisaged had 'hitherto been 
solely the concern of State and local effort', an observation that overlooked the 
important recent precedents of Commonwealth funding of the National Fitness 
Council and the Lady Gowrie pre-school centres. In any case Goodes' objection 
begged the question: what were the merits or otherwise of a broad 
Commonwealth entry into this area? 15 
Sensing the need for a substantive position on this question, especially in a 
context of increasing inquiries and requests from community organisations in 
regard to Commonwealth funding, Goodes made a decisive move. On May 4th 
1945 the Assistant Secretary drew the Treasurer's attention to the need for a 
'standard reply' and drafted just such a response. Chifley as Treasurer did not 
demur from Goodes' wording, so that the May 1945 text served as the basis for 
the Treasury{freasurer stock response to community groups for at least the next 
decade. 
The May 1945 fom1letter put forward two reasons why the Commonwealth was 
not prepared to assist in the fmancing of community centres. The first had to do 
with the Commonwealth's overall budgetary constraints, namely 
the Commonwealth's heavy commitments both"tor war purposes and 
in the transition period, including that involved in the Commonwealth-
State housing scheme. 
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The second had to do with the autonomy of the State governments, the letter 
claiming that at a meeting of the National Works Council in August 1944 the 
Commonwealth and the States agreed that the financing of State and Local 
government programmes was 'wholly a matter for the internal arrangements of 
the State concemed'.16 Both arguments were specious, the first partly so, the 
second completely so. On the first point, the real problem facing the Federal 
government in 1945, as Ooodes' cover note to Chifley acknowledged, was 
shortage of physical, not financial, resources and the solution to this problem lay 
in physical measures, such as rationing of building materials. On the second 
point, the proceedings of the National Works Council at its meeting in August 
1944 provided no basis whatsoever for the claim made and the implication 
contained in the Goodes draft letter. By prior agreement the meeting did not 
address the question of Commonwealth fmancial assistance for various types of 
State and Local public works. Two Premiers, it is true, did attempt to raise the 
issue- both, ironically, were clearly hoping to attract Commonwealth assistance 
- but the meeting reaffirmed that this question was one for a later meeting. (As 
it happened, neither full discussion nor resolutions, one way or the other, 
eventuated at later meetings of the Council). 17 
In early May 1945 DPWR made its third and what was to prove last attempt to 
initiate a CHC-type Commonwealth funding role. On lOth May an inter-
departmental meeting was convened by Coombs to firm up a Commonwealth 
stance on community facilities for an up-coming Commonwealth-State Housing 
Officers Conference. The May lOth meeting was presented with a long 
submission from Lloyd Ross which argued for a Commonwealth funding role, 
though in a very vague and (no doubt because of the housing bottleneck) 
defensive fashion. At this meeting Goodes made his second decisive move, by 
citing the form letter Chifley had approved as 'the Treasurer's attitude' to 
funding. This, again, was a mis-representation: in his cover note to Chifley 
Goodes had presented the form letter as a device to ward off outside 
organisations, pending a possible later policy decision on funding once the 
housing crisis had eased. At the same meeting Goodes successfully opposed a 
Lloyd Ross proposal for a 'Commonwealth Community Facilities Advisory 
Bureau'; this would be 'the thin edge of the wedge' of Commonwealth financial 
involvement.18 
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The last step in this phase took the form of yet another Treasury block on a 
DPWR position; this time on the part of the Treasurer himself (seemingly). The 
May lOth meeting had agreed, Goodes acquiescing, that while the 
Commonwealth 'should not encourage the States to [build] extensive facilities at 
present', it should encourage them 'to provide adequate land for future 
facilities', the cost to be CSHA-shared. While the new Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction, J.J. Dedman, endorsed this position, Chifley as Treasurer 
insisted that cost-shared land be limited to parks and playgrounds - as distinct 
from the full range of 'later stage' facilities that the meeting had 
countenanced.19 Accordingly, the joint Housing Officers' Conference in June 
1945 was presented with a grim Commonwealth prospectus: 
The Commonwealth's attitude was that whilst it was agreeable to 
contribute towards services normally included in housing projects, 
such as roads, water supply, sewerage, electric light, etc; it was not 
prepared to go very far in contributing to community 
fi .1. . 20 ac1 Illes .. . . 
The third phase of activity in this area extended from the June 1945 Conference 
to late 1946 and was marked by a lingering attachment on the part of DPWR 
officials to the possibility of Commonwealth finance for the contribution of 
community facilities. The submission to Dedman and Chifley presented by 
Coombs as the position of the May 1Oth meeting explicitly foreshadowed a 
separate submission by DPWR 'in the near future' on this issue. In fact, the 
submission, Coombs said, would deal with the building of community facilities 
in 'built-up' areas as well as new CSHA estates, a matter on which Lloyd Ross 
felt strongly. In keeping with this prospect DPWR and its Minister Dedman 
declined to accept Goodes' 'suggestion' that they use the form letter he had 
devised for Chifley. Instead, for the next year or so (to late 1946) the 
Department and its Minister adopted a more open-ended form letter for outside 
organisations, one which said that the question of Commonwealth financial 
assistance 'had not yet been decided'. As it happened, no further submission was 
prepared by Ross or Rudduck and no Commonwealth aid for building purposes 
eventuated during the life of the first, ten year CSHA (nor, for that matter, the 
1956 Agreement).21 . 
9 
A number of factors would appear to have contributed to the fizzling-out of the 
DPWR advocacy effort. One factor was the personal outlook and style of Dr. 
Lloyd Ross, the most senior officer with specialist responsibilities in this field. 
Ross, who was stationed in Sydney (itself a weakness in terms of bureaucratic 
influence) had a passionate interest in the social theory and ethos of the 
community facilities 'moyement' and in his role as promoter of research and 
information-exchange he functioned effectively. But Ross at times evinced an 
ambivalent attitude to government funding (the danger of 'paternalism') and his 
preparation of policy, including funding, submissions was surprisingly inept, 
probably a reflection of bureaucratic inexperience. A more important factor 
from mid 1945 was the bureaucratic separation of the DPWR units headed by 
Ross and Rudduck and the DPWR sections dealing with housing and building, 
both of which were moved into the new Department of Works and Housing set 
up in July 1945. This meant there was even less potential for leverage of 
community facilities into the CSHA, the more so because the Director of 
Housing, A.W. Welch, was a pragmatic generalist administrator, who lacked the 
intellect and vision of Ross and especially Rudduck, an architect-town 
planner.22 This bureaucratic development was not accidental; it was part of the 
inevitable breaking-up of the DPWR 'brains trust' planning function. A third, 
exacerbating factor which was accidental was the limited dissemination of the 
CHC's landmark Final Report. The Report was not tabled in Parliament until 
September 1945 (because of printing delays) and its public circulation was much 
less than anticipated (the Report did not sell at the price set and stockpiles were 
unintentionally destroyed).23 Whatever the reasons, the demise of the DPWR 
advocacy effort was symbolised by the termination of the Community Activities 
Bulletin in December 1946, a lively publication that had appeared regularly 
since November 1944.24 
From 1947 to the early 1950's, and probably later, the 'Treasury line' (as 
Goodes referred to it). became the sole Federal government public stance on the 
funding issue. The way in which the 1945 Goodes form letter was maintained 
and adapted deserves mention for the example it provides of Treasury thinking, 
tactics and influence in public policy processes. Not surprisingly, the letters sent 
out under the Treasurer's stamp, even during 1945-6, almost always avoided the 
suggestion that policy was in some sense under review or likely to change. More 
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surprisingly, until 1949 the letters avoided use of the term 'policy' at all -
thereby avoiding the sense that the government had somehow made a conscious 
choice not to fund construction (which indeed it had in 1945). Instead, the 
letters merely asserted that 'serious constitutional difficulties' made 
Commonwealth funding impossible. This standard claim rested on two 
assertions: that community facilities were services 'primarily' provided by State 
and Local governments (correct); and that the National Works Council in 1944 
had agreed that the financing of such services was 'a matter' for these 
governments (incorrect).25 
Was this argument sincere or merely a pretext? On the one hand, Goo des did 
present it to Fadden, in private, in 1950 as 'the basis' for the previous 
government's approach. On the other hand, it was not until 1950 that Goodes 
felt the atmosphere safe enough to draft a public reference for the Treasurer to 
CSHA clause 15(c), the provision that obviously undermined the 'constitutional' 
pretext.26 Moreover, some of the replies to outside organisations after 1947 
implicitly acknowledged that budgetary constraint was a 'difficulty' independent 
of any federalist problem. If the government was to assist one group, some 
letters said, it would be 'deluged' from all over the country.27 
With the change of government in 1949 Goodes and his staf continued to guide 
Treasurer responses on this issue and to do so in ways that indicated that the 
Department's real concern was and probably always had been - fiscal, not 
constitutional. When the incoming Treasurer was met with a barrage of 
requests from Councils in country areas, Goodes advised that the Coalition 
promises on aid for 'rural development' could not be interpreted in the way 
these organisations had done.28 When in 1952 and 1954 community groups 
submitted for finance on the grounds that they were servicing populations 
largely comprising Commonwealth defence personnel, Goodes again urged 
rejection. The precedent, he said, would be exploited endlessly by State 
governments - a view which, of course, quite discredited his old contrived 
rationale about constitutional barriers.29 
So far this account has attributed the non-emergence of strong Commonwealth 
funding role to three factors - certain limitations of and within DPWR, the 
priority of fmance for housing and Treasury's concern with overall expenditure 
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restraint. To what extent can the attitude of State governments also be 
considered a retarding factor? On the one hand there is clear evidence that at 
least some State Ministries were hostile to any Commonwealth activity that 
might conceivably interfere with their freedom of operation (including their 
ability to stay out of this general area altogether). In his submission to the May 
lOth 1945 inter-departmental meeting Lloyd Ross had listed as one obstacle to 
Commonwealth endeavour 
Apathy of some States to the problem; hostility of some States to 
Commonwealth assistance; difficulty of obtaining a general policy in 
co-operation with the States.30 
One especially suspicious government was the Dunstan-Hollway Coalition in 
Victoria in 1945. In January 1945 Coombs inquired whether an officer from 
the Community Facilities Section could liaise with State departments for the 
purpose of up-grading the central information service on State functions and 
amenities in this field. Whereas at least two States consented (both ALP 
governments), the Victorian reply was that community requests for information 
should be referred by the Commonwealth direct to the State govemment.31 
Four months later Coombs made a second overture. Could an officer 'consult' 
State officers when 'advising' community organisations on the enhancement of 
facilities? This suggestion brought a quite hostile rebuke. The Victorian 
government's 'viewpoint' was that such activity was an 'intrusion into domestic 
matters of State•.32 
In all likelihood most State administrations were not 'gung-ho' on expanded 
funding for community facilities. The Annual Reports of the N.S.W. and 
Victorian Housing Commissions suggest that the new public housing authorities 
were extremely parsimonious in their release of funds for community buildings, 
though less so in their setting-aside of land (perhaps because the Commonwealth 
may have agreed to include some of this land in CSHA fmancing).33 Nor is 
there any evidence that State politicians made a concerted effort to pressure the 
Commonwealth for finance. But this is not to say they would have opposed or 
declined Commonwealth money, if it had been offered. In fact, at least two 
Premiers - Cain during 1947-9 and Playford in 1954 - lent their support to 
community proposals for joint-government funding of specific projects. 34 The 
real obstacles, then, to the commitment of Commonwealth money were the 
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factors mentioned above, not the knowledge - vividly borne out in the CSHA 
housing negotiations - that the Commonwealth could not hope to tightly control 
the manner in which jointly funded programmes were administered by the 
States.35 
Town Planning 
In the area of town planning the pattern of Commonwealth role development 
had both similarities to, and differences from, the pattern observed in the area of 
community facilities. On the one hand, there was the same steep height between 
the Commonwealth role advocated by the Commonwealth Housing Commission, 
the role subsequently fought for by the Department of Post-War Reconstruction 
and the post-war role (or rather absence of role) that emerged in 1945. On the 
other hand, the interplay of the factors of resistance was somewhat different 
than it had been in the area of community facilities. Treasury opposition to a 
post-war Commonwealth role was again a decisive factor- arguably~ decisive 
factor (especially in an important episode in 1950). But, unlike the area of 
community facilities, a second decisive factor of resistance was the attitude of 
State governments, especially at the Ministerial and Premier level. Weakness in 
administrative finesse was again apparent within DPWR but it is doubtful if this 
altered the underlying situation, while the urgency of the housing problem was 
not quite as important a constraint as it was in the area of community facilities. 
In a chapter on 'National, Regional and Town Planning' in its Final Report the 
Commonwealth Housing Commission derjved its model of a Commonwealth 
role in town planning from a set of bold principles. Economic and social 
development, it began, must be governed by community needs, not by the profit 
motive, as in the past. Community needs could only be ascertained and satisfied 
by conscious planning; the war-time situation presented an unprecedented and 
vital opportunity to establish peace-time planning. The purpose of public 
housing could not be realised without 'town planning'; likewise town planning 
could not be achieved in isolation but only as part of regional and national 
economic planning. At the interface of town and regional planning lay the great 
problem of the 'unplanned cities' and the need for an 'urban' focus and 
structure. 36 
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The Commission's overarching recommendation was for a 'Commonwealth 
Planning Authority'. The role of this statutory body would be to formulate an 
overall national economic and physical planning framework and, subject to 
Ministerial control, to 'direct' Commonwealth departments and exert pressure 
on State authorities to work within this framework. Within this apparatus the 
Commission wanted to see a 'Commonwealth Regional and Town Planning 
Council'. Along with the research and information functions, this body should 
have the power to 
(i) Promote and co-ordinate policies on regional and town planning ... . , 
[and] (ii) suggest general principles for regional and town planning, with 
which State, regional and local authorities shall comply, after due 
regard to local conditions. 
In a recommendation which echoed its stance on community facilities, the 
Commision recommended that Commonwealth finance for public housing not 
be made available to the States until they had taken steps 'to erect and implement 
regional and town planning legislation•.37 
The CHC acknowledged that 'replanning' of older suburbs and cities would 
involve 'large sums of money over many years'. Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth would have to contribute to this expense, in the form of loan 
advances and subsidies, provided that the replanning schemes - local, urban or 
regional - had been 'approved' by the Commonwealth Planning Authority. 
Finally, the CHC said, Commonwealth must establish a prestigious 'National 
School of Physical Planning' to provide a high standard of inter-disciplinary 
research and training in planning.38 
In the months leading up to and following the submission of the CHC's Einlll 
~ in August 1944 the Department of Post-War Reconstruction attempted to 
push a modified CHC agenda. The DPWR made seemingly no attempt to canvass 
the proposals for a Commonwealth Planning Authority and a Commonwealth 
Regional and Town Planning Council. But the idea behind these proposals - that 
the Commonwealth should exert pressure on the States to legislate for and 
implement town planning - was not entirely and immediately forsaken. The 
most ready-made and powerful instrument to pressure the States was the 
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Commonwealth's offer of subsidised housing fmance. Resort to this means of 
pressure, however, carried political risks for the Federal government. As early 
as April1943, at the inaugural meeting of the CHC, Chifley as Minister for Post-
War Reconstruction had warned that 
There are those who have great ideals on town planning and new 
cities, and it is a very desirable thing. Realities must be faced, 
however 
-realities being the pressure on governments to get moving on housing.39 As it 
happened, a link between housing and town planning was retained during the 
drafting of the CSHA in 1944- due mainly to very strong advocacy to Coombs 
on the part of the Comrnission.40 The formal CSHA clause put to, and endorsed 
by the Premiers' Conference in August 1944 stipulated that 
the States shall have adequate legislation to enable them to control the 
development of. .. 
(d) town planning, and shall set up an authority, or authorities to 
cover these activities and ensure that these powers be exercised in a 
co-ordinated fashion . 41 
This provision was a potential basis upon which the Commonwealth might have 
pushed for a CHC-type regulatory or monitoring role. Instead, in the year that 
followed, the Department of Post-War Reconstruction attempted but failed to 
consolidate or indeed establish any post-war role for the Commonwealth in 
relation to the States on town planning. At the instigation of DPWR, the Acting 
Prime Minister (F. M. Forde) wrote a long letter to each Premier in November 
1944, highlighting the historic need and opportunity for proper planning of 
towns and cities arising from the commitment to large-scale post-war 
programmes of housing and public works. The letter proposed that a 
Commonwealth-State Officers' Conference be held to 'consider the [CHC's] 
suggestions' and to discuss legislation and implementation strategies being 
prepared by each State, with the hope of encouraging 'some degree of 
uniformity•.42 
The Prime Ministerial letter put forward two specific proposals, both of which 
had been formulated by DPWR and endorsed in principle by Cabinet.43 The 
first proposal was for each State to establish a 'State Town Planning Service' - a 
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'small organisation of highly trained [planning] specialists' whose role would 
essentially be one of indirect quality control over Local governments. The 
central State body would 'advise' Local governments and, in conjunction with 
them, 'review' their plans and procedures. To encourage the States, the letter 
proposed that the Commonwealth finance 50% of the cost of these bodies for 
three to five years after the·war (when the demand for planning would be at its 
peak). 
The second proposal was for the Commonwealth to establish a Commonwealth 
Town Planning Bureau. The role of the Bureau would be to act as a resource 
back-up to the State Town Planning Services; it would not deal directly with 
Local governments. The November 1944 letter outlined certain functions that 
appeared non-contentious: the dissemination and exchange of research and 
information, especially from overseas; the provision and financing of 
professional training courses; and overall town planning in Commonwealth 
territories. But the letter also spoke of the Bureau 'assisting the States by 
undertaking special projects on their behalf while follow-up documents 
prepared by DPWR (Grenfell Rudduck) and circulated to the States said that the 
Bureau, with a staff of 10-20 professionals, would 'undertake investigations of 
town planning problems in Australia' and 'co-ordinate the research work of all 
States·.44 
It soon became clear that several of the Premiers were not going to accept 
warmly the Federal government's overture. Two Premiers - Playford (South 
Australia) and Dunstan (Victoria)- announced they would only send 'observers' 
to the Commonwealth-State Officers' Conference set down for April 1945; in 
Dunstan's case, this was despite strong representations from associations 
representing architects, engineers and town planners for Victoria to send active 
representatives.45 In his letter finalising arrangements for the Conference, 
Dedman, as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, emphasised that the purpose 
was to examine ways 'in which the Commonwealth [could] assist the States to 
give effect to their [own] policies·.46 Opening the Conference, Coombs was also 
at pains to reassure State representatives that the Commonwealth did not want 'to 
tell the States what sort of town planning legislation they should have'. The 
Commonwealth, Coombs said, did not want to encroach on areas that were not 
its 'proper preserve·.47 
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Proceedings at the Conference also proved difficult for DPWR, but the 
Department eventually did make some headway. In the early stages most State 
representatives expressed resentment that the Federal government had under-
estimated State experience of and commitment to town planning (as one officer 
put it, 'town and regional planning wasn't discovered in Canberra in 1943'). No 
State representative pressed very actively for Commonwealth financial 
assistance though all States except South Australia indicated they were prepared 
to accept Commonwealth money - provided there were no strings attached. All 
States agreed that the chief problem they faced was a shortage of qualified town 
planners.48 
As the Conference wore on, attitudes softened, helped in no small part by the co-
operative stance of the NSW representatives. At the end of the Conference 
DPWR managed to elicit a formal 'Expression of Opinion' that the 
Commonwealth Town Planning Bureau, in addition to its role in 
Commonwealth territories, should have three wider functions: a Secretariat for 
regular Commonwealth-State meetings on town planning; an education, 
publication and information function; and assistance to State educational 
institutions for training programmes for town planners. No mention was made, 
however, of the earlier, more contentious proposals for research and direct 
involvement in State town planning on an ad hoc basis by the Bureau.49 The 
Department also managed to elicit, on a somewhat more informal basis, 
Conference endorsement of the Commonwealth's 50% subsidy offer, the 
subsidy being widened to apply to town planners employed by Local 
governments as well as those employed by State governments. Significantly the 
whole tenor of discussion was that the offer carried 'no strings', something that 
was not made clear in the November 1944 letter.50 On this basis, the 
Department in June prepared a submission to Cabinet seeking approval for the 
Prime Minister to write to the Premiers to request ratification of the Conference 
decisions. 51 
At this point the Department began to feel the impact of a second source of 
antagonism to its efforts. From the outset Goodes and his small number of staff 
in the Social Services Branch of Treasury had opposed the idea of any form of 
Commonwealth financial assistance to the States for town planning. In 
November 1944 Goodes had unsuccessfully submitted to Chifley (at that time 
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still Treasurer and Minister for Post-War Reconstruction) to have the 50-50 
subsidy proposal rejected. 
On that occasion Goodes had used four main arguments, most of which he was to 
repeat in mid-1945. First, he pointed out that no policy precedent existed for 
Commonwealth funding of town planning outside Commonwealth territories, a 
line identical to the one he had initially used in relation to community facilities 
(and Goodes himself drew attention to this). Second, he agreed that, as town 
planning impinged on socia\ fields such as health and education, no decision on a 
long-term role in town planning should be made until a similar decision was 
made in relation to these other fields. Third, he agreed that Commonwealth 
fmancial assistance was superfluous as most States were already active in the 
area- how active, and with what degree of adequacy, he did not feel obliged to 
say. Finally, he insisted that a financial commitment to staffing would lead 
inexorably to pressure for cost-sharing of the total liabilities involved in the 
implementation of town planning (heavy expenses such as compensation for land 
resumption). When in subsequent correspondence with DPWR it was pointed 
out that the offer of finance was limited to five years, Goodes reverted to his 
previous (third) point.52 
The proceedings of the Officers' Conference in April only hardened the 
Treasury position, prompting it to a series of ultimately successful manoeuvres. 
In late June Goodes submitted, through the Treasurer, for the DPWR agenda 
paper to be rejected, Goodes arguing that the 'no strings attached' post-
Conference subsidy offer was but 'mere handing out of money gratuitously in 
relief of State budgets•.53 The Treasury submission paid off: Cabinet decided 
to defer the establishment of a Commonwealth Town Planning Bureau and 
negotiations over the subsidy until the Premiers' Conference in August. 54 
The Treasury Assistant Secretary kept up the pressure. In July DPWR drafted a 
letter from the Prime Minister to the Premiers, requesting discussion of town 
planning at the Premiers' Conference, but specifically on the two sets of 
proposals endorsed by the Officers' Conference (the Bureau and the 50% 
subsidy). 55 In response, Goodes wrote to DPWR, requesting that it couch the 
invitation in general terms and omit reference to specific proposals. At the 
same time Goodes also advised Chifley not to 'stress' the question of fmancial 
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assistance at the Conference. 56 When DPWR went ahead with its original draft, 
Goodes stuck to his position and on the eve of the Conference again urged 
Chifley not to 'press' the subsidy offer. 57 
This time Goodes' lobbying proved completely successful. Discussion on this 
item at the Conference was brief and the outcome, for DPWR, utterly negative. 
The first to speak was Dedman who reiterated the proposals agreed to by the 
Officers' Conference. He was followed by the NSW Deputy Premier, J.M. 
Baddeley who, after outlining his government's approach, said NSW had 'no 
objection to Commonwealth fmancial assistance'. The Victorian Premier, A.A. 
Dunstan, spoke next, arguing forcefully against the idea of a Commonwealth 
role ('duplication'). The only other speaker was Chifley who commented: 
'I assume from your remarks that you [Dunstan] consider that the 
matter ought to be left to the States' 
- at which point discussion lapsed and the meeting moved to the next item. 
Whether or not his comment caught the outlook of the other Premiers, it is clear 
that Chifley made no attempt to persuade the Premiers - for example, by 
capitalising on the attitude of the NSW government. 58 
Worse still for DPWR, in negotiations with the States over the fmal draft of the 
CSHA in the weeks leading up to the Premiers' Conference, the Department had 
been forced to truncate the draft clause bearing on town planning. Now only 
legislation, not machinery and implementation, was to be required of the 
States.58 Reviewing the Premiers' Conference proceedings in the weeks that 
followed, Coombs and his staff decided to abandon both the idea of the Bureau 
and the salary subsidy. Their efforts now turned to negotiation with the new 
Department of Works and Housing over responsibility for town planning in 
Commonwealth territories. 60 
In the months and years that followed only a few small traces of the CHC and 
DPWR vision materialised. Under the aegis of the Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction the Universities' Commission fmanced Extension Lecture series 
on town planning at the two major universities.61 . Within the Department of 
Works and Housing a small Town Planning Service' (a staff of three specialists) 
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was set up to cater for Commonwealth territories.62 And perhaps on a few ad 
hoc occasions grants for town planning purposes were made to locations of 
Commonwealth defence establishments. But the general role of the 
Commonwealth remained the same as it had been before 1939- non-existent. 
This position was encapsulated by the Minister for Health and Social Services 
(N.E. McKenna) in 1949, when explaining away a one-off grant to a defence 
centre: 
The Commonwealth would of course, be travelling beyond its proper 
sphere if it were to embark promiscuously on town-planning projects 
throughout Australia. That is not the function of the Commonwealth 
in normal circumstances. It is a matter for the State governments and 
for municipal authorities.63 
The Commonwealth position was confirmed in an even more explicit fashion in 
1950 and in a manner which underlined the pre-eminent influence of Treasury 
on the internal counsels of the Commonwealth bureaucracy and Ministry. On 
two occasions, February and October 1950, Prime Minister Menzies received a 
formal request from the N.S.W. government for the Commonwealth to 
contribute one-third of the projected cost of implementation of the Cumberland 
County Council scheme, with the same proportion of the cost to be borne both 
by the State and Local governments. The archival documents on this matter have 
not yet been studied but the main argument used by N.S.W. Premier McGirr in 
public was the proposition that it had been the Commonwealth which had 
required the State, through the CSHA, to introduce the legislation in the first 
place.64 
The Federal government's rejection of this request in December 1950 bore all 
the hall-marks of the Treasury line. Just as Goodes had done on the issue of 
community facilities, the letter of reply from Menzies put up three reasons. 
First, it appealed to 'custom': it had 'been accepted over a long period' that town 
planning was not a field for the Commonwealth. Then, it attempted to bolster 
this point with the familiar, fatuous reference to the meeting of the National 
Works Council in 1944. Finally, the Menzies letter of reply introduced the 
fiscal argument, no doubt Treasury's real concern. Consent to this request, the 
letter said, would necessarily set a precedent and 'mean the assumption by the 
Commonwealth of a new and costly responsibility•.65 
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Regional Planning 
Most of the patterns observed in the two fields of policy so far discussed can be 
observed in the related field of regional planning. Once again there was a gulf 
between the broad concept and recommendations of the Commonwealth Housing 
Commission and the follow-up position of the Department o~ Post-War 
Reconstruction. Because regional planning was perceived by other quarters of 
the Federal government to encompass a broader or perhaps different range of 
government activity, policy initiation within DPWR in 1944 was not the 
preserve of the same small number of officers as was the case with community 
facilities and town planning. As for impediments to the acceptance and 
implementation of CHC and DPWR proposals, the decision to give priority in 
planning to housing was of significance, as it had been in the case of community 
facilities and at one point threatened to be in town planning. 
The major impediment to the development of a strong peace-time 
Commonwealth role, however, was the same factor that had been a major block 
on Commonwealth town planning incentives: the problem of the States. More so 
perhaps than with town planning, this factor operated not only through the 
actions of State governments themselves but through the anticipation of State 
reactions by Commonwealth officers. The attitude and influence of Treasury 
officers has not been fully studied but the evidence points to a fairly negative 
outlook. Overall, it must be said, however, that the role of the Commonwealth 
that did develop was of some significance, unlike the case of community 
facilities and town planning. The main reason for this was probably a 
perception amongst the State governments, as well as the Federal government, 
that regional planning had economic and especially military-strategic value, 
unlike community facilities and town planning. Nevertheless, the importance of 
the pre-1949 role should not be exaggerated; nor, accordingly, the significance 
of the victory of the Liberal-Country Party government in 1949. 
As with town planning, the Commonwealth had no pre-war general involvement 
in 'regional planning', nor for that matter had the ~tates. In the 1930s Federal 
politicians in both the Country Party and the ALP had made frequent reference 
to the desirability of a 'de-centralisation' of industry and population. The first 
occasion on which the term 'regional planning' was evident in relation to post-
war preparations by the Federal government was the inaugural meeting of the 
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'Reconstruction Sub-Committee on Public Works' in May 1942.66 It is possible 
that the term, and the concepts associated with it, had arisen from war-time 
military organisation; at least three Commonwealth authorities had based their 
administrative apparatus on 'regions', the exactness of the defmition of 'region' 
varying in each case.67 · Outside the Government, by 1942 a variety of 
organisations were beginning to advocate a case for post-war public works in 
terms of 'regional' utility and appeal. 
From the outset there were marked differences both in the degree of support for 
regional planning among Commonwealth reconstruction authorities and in the 
nature of the concept they articulated. The Secondary Industries Commission 
14-_ which, like the CHC, was an offshoot of DPWR, tended to talk in terms of 'de-
'if' centralisation'. Even here, in keeping with its highly pragmatic approach, it was 
slow to develop ideas about an overall approach.68 The Office of the 
Commonwealth Co-ordinator-General Works and the Public Works Section of 
DPWR, on the other hand, managed to instigate a resolution in Aprill944 by the 
National Works Council, calling on responsible authorities to 'review the 
possibilities of planning electricity and water conservation projects on a regional 
basis·.69 
The Commonwealth Housing Commission proposed a very much wider form of 
regional economic planning. Both in its recommendations for a Commonwealth 
Planning Authority and a Commonwealth Regional and Town Planning Council 
within the Authority the Commission made it clear it wanted planning at the 
regional, as well as national and town level, to encompass nothing less than the 
(a) use and development of all land; 
(b) movements, distribution and growth of the population; 
(c) distribution of industrial activities, so as to secure a balanced 
economic development of primary, secondary and other industries; 
and 
(d) amelioration of the conditions of urban and rural life 70 
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- that is, virtually the entire economic and social structure. (The CHC did not 
itself make any recommendations about the content of such a broad plan. In this 
its Final Report exhibited a characteristic of much other contemporary writing 
on town and regional planning - trenchant argument for the scope and apparatus 
of planning with very little hint of the political conflicts and choices that would 
be expressed through this apparatus.) 
The differences in approach amongst the advisory authorities as to the scope of 
regional planning were paralleled within the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction and may have had their source there. The departmental 
differences were encapsulated in a seminal paper written by the economist P.A. ~ 
Dorrian, soon to specialise in the Public Works Section. The paper delineated 
three concepts: 'De-centralisation', which amounted to an undisciplined 
1 
'spreading of economic activity over the face of the countryside'; 'Project 1 
Planning', which represented the co-ordinated deployment of secondary \ 
I 
industry, public works and housing in the regional area; and 'Regional 
Planning', in which the attempted co-ordination also encompassed transport, 
iminigration and social welfare services. Regional planning, the paper said, 
aimed at economic and social 'self-sufficiency', the key to which was a 'strong 
metropolitan centre•.71 
Over the next three months, a polarisation of views around these concepts 
occurred within the 'think-tank' circles of DPWR. Three architect-town 
planners (Rudduck, Walter Bunning and J. Oldham) who worked on housing, 
community facilities and town planning issues, strongly affirmed the necessity 
for 'integrating' economic and social development.72 On the other hand, three 
economists and one political scientist (N.G. Butlin, A.H. Tange, G.G. Firth and 
L.F. Crisp respectively), criticised this approach as grossly unrealistic, claiming 
it under-estimated economic, political and constitutional complexities.73 The 
resultant critique put to the Director-General by the Director of Research (J.G. 
Crawford), himself an economist, was an affirmation of this more limited 
position. The 'paramount' fact, Crawford insisted, was that planning for 
integrated regions with a strong identity would . 'heavily invade the field of 
State's rights'. The most fruitful approach for the Commonwealth was to select 
a few unsettled and under-developed regions, preferably with strategic 
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importance, and seek to set up planning apparatus jointly with the one or more 
States involved.14 
This strategy of 'half-planning' was subsequently endorsed by the government 
and submitted to a Premiers' Conference in October 1944. The reaction of the 
Premiers showed that Crawford had not exaggerated the touchiness of State 
authorities. A resolution was readily accepted: 
That comprehensive surveys of the resources of important regions 
would be carried out according to principles to be agreed upon 
between the Commonwealth and the States. 
But a more probing proposal, that 
the formation of representative advisory bodies be encouraged," and 
use made, wherever practicable, of such bodies as already exist 
had to be qualified, at the behest of at least two Premiers, by an agreement that 
such bodies would direct relevant enquiries to the Commonwealth 'through State 
government channels' _75 
The October Premiers' Conference had established that the Federal government 
would not be in a position to achieve the maximum co-ordination of economic 
development and social welfare. One resolution provided that each goveTilllient 
would delineate 'regional boundaries' in the territories for which it was 
responsible. The Commonwealth's submission to the Conference gave the 
purpose of this operation as the classification of public works, 'employment 
trends' and de-centralisation of industry projects. Housing, health and 
education, as well as immigration and land transport, were not mentioned?6 
This position of partial planning had not been settled for by the Federal 
government solely because of the Federal division of powers. One DPWR 
officer (L.F. Crisp) who was somewhat of an authority, did believe that a 'Yes' 
vote at the 'Fourteen Powers' Referendum would give the Commonwealth 
much more scope for thorough regional planning_77 But there were other 
considerations, political and bureaucratic, inhibiting the government. In July 
1943 the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction had told the Director of 
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Research that housing had a 'higher' pnonty than regional planning. 
Accordingly, the Policy Director informed his staff that their enthusiasm for 
exploring this new mode of planning must not 'swamp' their work in 
formulating measures for the post-war expansion of housing_78 
The decision taken at the 1944 Premiers' Conference moulded the nature of 
regional planning activities for the next five years. The range of initiatives 
taken by the Commonwealth and the States, sometimes in conjunction and 
sometimes not, fell far short of the model propounded by the CHC and related 
staff inside the DPWR. Commonwealth effort fell into three categories: 
research, education, and resource allocation. 
The main resolution at the Premiers' Conference in October 1944 had provided 
for joint Commonwealth-State research surveys of 'important' regions. As they 
had foreshadowed, all State governments undertook the definition and mapping 
of intra-State regions over the next two years. These maps contained basic 
geographical data and also some economic analysis, such as structure of 
employment and volume and type of production. The Commonwealth played 
some part in this activity. It was 'consulted' in this data-gathering by at least one 
State and probably more.79 It gained agreement in principle at an Officers' 
Conference in May and a Premiers' Conference in August 1945 for a 'regular 
exchange of information about regional resources·.80 By September 1947, 
when the second Officers' Conference on regional planning was held, it had 
collated from the States a 'regional map of Australia'. Whether it had been 
supplied with the accompanying geographical and economic data is doubtful, 
however. 
Commonwealth research activity was at its most concerted in regard to select 
regions. Officers in the 'Regional Planning Division', which had been formed 
within DPWR after the Premiers' Conference of October 1944, continued to do 
general background research on what seemed economically promising regions, l 
such as the Ord, Clarence and Gwydir River areas. The Division also undertook 
intensive land use surveys, in conjunction with other specialist Commonwealth 
agencies, in areas of interest to more than one Stl!te or to the Commonwealth 
directly. 81 At least some of this work led to, or was part of, a broader executive 
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effort (eg. the inter-governmental/legislative agreements on the Murray and 
Snowy Rivers and on Northern Australia).82 
The Commonwealth also pushed in the direction of education and publicity, in 
spite of the check it had received at the Premiers' Conference in October 1944. 
From late 1944 through to 1949, the Regional Planning Division produced a 
monthly News Summar,y, a magazine with the same aims as the Community 
Activities Bulletin and somewhat similar deficiencies - namely a tendency to 
exaggerate popular S!Jpport for the Department's concepts and to avoid 
discussion of their political complexities and ramifications. This magazine and 
other publications were, nevertheless, a valuable source of cross-information 
for the twenty to thirty regional bodies that had formed around Australia. All 
these 'committees' had some problems in common, not the least being the 
reluctance of the State governments to devolve powers and functions. Through 
the DPWR publications the government continued to pay lip service to the 
strengthening of these regional organisations (the Federal Opposition did not) 
but little impact was made in the late 1940s on the power or status of these 
entities vis a vis State govemments.83 
In terms of resource allocation and the outlay of expenditure the Federal 
government's major achievement was undoubtedly its leadership in the 
negotiation of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electricity Scheme. While this 
scheme was of great significance as an inter-governmental public works project, 
its significance as an overall regional planning exercise is more open to question. 
In any case the project was limited to one regional area; the Commonwealth did 
not develop a regionalist role in the allocation of public works generally. 
Neither the Regional Planning Division nor the Office of the Commonwealth 
Co-ordinator-General of Works seem to have been consulted beforehand by the 
States on regional factors bearing on the selection of public works. 84 Nor was 
the Division's handful of pet regional profiles made the basis of priority projects 
by the States. For that matter, there was no public evidence that the 
Commonwealth itself was trying to bring a regional approach to bear on the 
long-term capital works programmes it had drawn up the field of defence, civil 
aviation, shipping, postal services, war service housing and immigration. 85 The 
furthest the government went was to undertake studies of the regional context 
and 'prospects' for at least two of its major capital works projects. 86 
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In the mind of DPWR, one policy question falling within the framework of the 
regional concept was 'de-centralisation' and here the Federal government did 
attempt a significant expenditure initiative. Under the heading 'De-
centralisation of Secondary Industries- Commonwealth Responsibilities' the 
government put a resolution to the August 1945 Premiers' Conference 
proposing Commonwealth 
Provision of financial assistance to the States, especially in respect of 
the capital and/or operating costs of particular undertakings provided 
-(a) examination reveals that the success of the project in the general 
national interest and that the financial costs involved are substantial in 
relation to the State or States concerned.81 
In supporting de-centralisation DPWR also fought to retain the concept of 
balanced and integrated regional planning. According to this concept, the key to 
the stability and growth of a region was a strong and varied urban centre .. 
Accordingly, DPWR emphasised in the material it sent out to enquirers in 1945 
that 
De-centralisation must not be interpreted to mean indiscriminate 
scattering of single towns around the countryside.'single industry' 
towns should be avoided as far as possible. 88 
Chifley also spoke along these lines at the Premiers' Conference. While he 
stressed the economic inefficiency of urban conglomeration he also insisted 
there was no prospect of successfully founding secondary industries in the 
smaller States except in the capital city. 89 
The discussion at the August Conference showed that the Premiers were a long 
way from grasping or accepting this regional approach. It also showed they had 
no intention of allowing Commonwealth interference in their own approach to 
de-centralisation. Moreover, they displayed an optimism about the prospects 
for reversing the 'drift to the cities' that did not reflect an awareness of the need 
for expensive incentives to private industry.90 
This angle had been discussed at a Conference of the Secondary Industries 
Commission with State Liaison Officers in November 1944. The Conference 
had identified several factors amenable to governmental manipulation: 
27 
'transport, labour supply, power and fuel, water supply, suitable factory 
accommodation, housing and . immigration'. 91 In the period following this 
Conference only one instance has been found of inter-governmental 
investigation along these lines. In January 1945 correspondence began over a 
national system of freight concessions - at the instigation of the 
Commonwealth.92 The States seemed to prefer to tackle alone the question of 
assistance to interested firms. This at least was the message the Commonwealth 
received from the Premiers of New South Wales and Victoria at the August 
1945 Premiers' Conference. Both were adamant that 'in such a big subject as de-
centralisation, the Commonwealth ought not to determine the policy of the 
States·.93 
After 1945 the States did not adopt a regionalist approach to de-centralisation. 
Measures of assistance to private firms were introduced (without the 
foreshadowed Commonwealth subsidies). But generally there were no 
preconditions pertaining to the encouragement of regionalisation. The sale or 
lease of the new Commonwealth munitions factories proved a second stimulus to 
de-centralisation. But the majority of plant was sited on the fringes of the 
existing major cities, too close to form the nuclei of adjacent regions.94 
The question of whether the development of Commonwealth activities in 
regional planning in the 1940s was retarded by Treasury officials is one worth 
further enquiry. Of relevance here is the fact that, according to Butlin and 
Schedvin (1977), Cabinet in July 1945 rejected a DPWR proposal 'to establish a 
fully-fledged Commonwealth authority to administer de-centralisation policy', 
Cabinet 'preferring a less conspicuous intrusion into the field of the States and 
one without financial obligation'. Butlin and Schedvin's observation on the 
general fate of early post-war de-centralisation efforts is also germane: 
It was generally accepted that a serious attack on the problem [of de-
centralisation] depended on detailed Commonwealth-State co-
operation and the expenditure of large sums of money, but the 
Commonwealth was not prepared to make a large financial 
commitment and the States were more interested in competing 
between themselves for new industries.95 
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Research for this paper has not as yet confirmed that Treasury was a source of 
opposition to the DPWR submission in July 1945 but two pieces of evidence so 
far collected suggest Treasury would have been opposed to the 'expenditure of 
large sums of money' in this area. 
The first piece of evidence is Goodes' notes to Chifley on the 'Regional 
Planning' item at the August 1945 Premiers' Conference. Referring to the 
question of the fmancing of regional resource surveys, Goodes claimed that the 
Commonwealth position at the October 1944 Premiers' Conference was that 'the 
primary responsibility belonged to the States and that the Commonwealth would 
make a contribution where the work would benefit the Commonwealth as a 
whole' -a position he advised Chifley to maintain.96 Goodes' account was 
incorrect, indeed misleading. The Commonwealth submission had made no 
mention of any 'primary responsibility' and had said that, in addition to surveys 
of national value, the Commonwealth 'was prepared to share costs of regional 
organisations such as those implicit in resources surveys'. While at one point in 
discussion at the Premiers' Conference, Curtin did signal a position identical to 
the one claimed by Goodes, on further questioning from the Premiers, Curtin 
and also Chifley made it clear that the terms and extent of Commonwealth 
financial assistance was open to future negotiation.97 Goodes also referred to a 
DPWR proposal for publicity. The Commonwealth-State Officers Conference 
on Regional Planning in April 1945 had recommended a 'publication' on 
government plans to cater for the 'widespread public interest' in the subject. 
Goodes advised the Treasurer that publicity 'might well be confined to a 
comprehensive press statement'.98 
The second piece of evidence pertains to DPWR's staffing estimates for its 
Regional Planning Division in 1948. Whereas the Public Service Board had to 
that time approved only nine permanent positions, the Department sought for 
approval for thirty-three positions. P.W. Nette, a Treasury Assistant Secretary, 
counter-submitted that the DPWR bid was 'excessive'. Nette based his case on 
the views of State government officials, ascertained directly by Treasury: 
From conversations had by Treasury with Regional Planning Officers 
from the State[ s], it is clear that.the feeling in the States is that the 
Commonwealth should devote itself to limited fields beyond the scope 
of any individual State, and avoid overlapping with State activities.99 
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In the light of evidence such as this and the discussion above concerning other 
obstacles or factors of resistance it is surely necessary to question the assessment 
of Lloyd and Troy (1978) that 
The accession to power of a coalition government led by R.G. Menzies 
effectively shuffled any· comprehensive plan for urban and regional 
planning and development into an administrative limbo. Menzies' 
1949 policy speech set the theme for Commonwealth attitudes to urban 
and regional development in the laissezfaire generation which was to 
follow.lOO 
The conclusion of this paper is that the closed horizons and attitudes of the 
1950's had descended well before 1949. In the three fields examined here, the 
key defeats for the 'New Order' were all inflicted during 1944-5. 
Postscript 
The historical analysis in this paper gives rise to questions pertinent to the fields 
of urban studies and public policy. The paper, for example, invites comparison 
between developments in the 1940s and the rise and fall of an urban and regional 
planning role at the Commonwealth level in the 1970s. It also raises the question 
of whether housing is a natural priority of government over community 
facilities and planning of the physical environment. Presumably the reason 
Chifley indicated to DPWR that housing had priority over the three fields 
studied here was because he believed it to be a much bigger political issue. But 
was this belief based solely on the assumption that voters wanted decent housing 
before community facilities and town plans?; or was it also a reflection of thefact 
that the resurgence of the movement for community facilities and physical 
planning did not occur until the early 1940s, a few crucial years after the 
resurgence of the slum abolition movement? (indeed, the leadership of the two 
lobbies overlapped).101 
The paper also showed that while Chifley, as Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction, did impose a broad framework on Commonwealth action in the 
three fields studied (i.e. the 'housing-first' framework) within this framework 
he was willing to rely, as Treasurer, on crucial strategies formulated by 
Treasury officials. In other words , the paper provides evidence both of 
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Ministerial independence from bureaucratic policy advisers and Ministerial 
reliance on these advisers. Perhaps, if its formulation had been studied more 
closely, Chifley's 'housing-first' framework might also have been seen as, in 
part, the product of Treasury influence. 
In any case, the tactics used by Treasury in the three fields studied here should be 
of special interest to students of public policy-making. As evidenced by this 
paper, these tactics included the following: 
in the face of pressure for a Commonwealth entry into a new field, the 
avoidance of any reference to the substantive merits or otherwise of entry 
and, instead, the making of a tautological appeal to 'custom', by saying that 
the field at issue had 'always been' the responsibility of another level of 
government; 
when the absence of a substantive justification against entry could no longer 
be sustained, the basing of such a justification on distorted, indeed 
fabricated evidence (e.g. the reference to the National Works Council); 
the 'selling' of this unsound justification to the Minister on the basis of its 
being merely a convenient, temporary 'facade' to ward off outside 
lobbying,pending a proper policy review as soon as circumstances became 
more favourable; 
in policy-making confrontations with another department, the presentation 
of the Minister's facade as the Minister's substantive 'attitude'; 
the omission of the foreshadowed policy review, even when circumstances 
did become more favourable; and 
in policy and resource allocation battles with another department, the 
obtaining of information detrimental to that department by means of direct 
- and presumably secret - contact with that department's counterparts 
(indeed rivals) at another level of the Federal system. 
The general question arises as to whether such tactics are typical of the 
behaviour of Treasury and other departments at other times and circumstances. 
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In the specific case of Treasury, posing this question also leads to another 
general question about underlying motivation. Is hostility to new fields of 
expenditure and governmental activity to be attributed simply to the Treasury's 
(or, in the 1980s, Department of Finance's) function of expenditure-revenue 
management? Or can it be attributed also in part to the impact of theoretical 
assumptions (in the form of macro-economic theory) or social value-
judgements (that certain fields are economically or socially more desirable than 
others)? Analysis of the role of Treasury in these terms is long overdue in the 
Australian public policy and' administration literature. 
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